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This article first aims to draw attention to, and diagnose, the failure of
IR’s sociological turn to extend the domain of sociological reason into
the philosophical turf of epistemology and thereby fulfill the full prom-
ises of the postpositivist turn. Its second purpose is to revive and deploy
the radical version of the sociology of knowledge that can achieve an
autonomous reconstruction of epistemology suited to a reflexive, post-
Kantian consciousness. The diagnosis begins by tracing the erasure of
the radical sociological position in the connected evolutions of sociology
and international relations (IR). It shows that the derailing of the “sociolog-
ical revolution” was paradoxically mediated by the consolidation of social
constructionism and science studies, reproduced in IR through their coun-
terparts in the “sociological turn”: constructivism and the sociology of IR.
In these otherwise reflexive developments, the progression of sociological
reason was halted by a self-imposed limitation on the extension of sociologi-
cal analysis to all domains of thought and the endorsement of an idealist
and institutionalist ontology of the social. A reformulation of the forgotten,
radical sociological position clarifies the implications for IR of a transition
to a postphilosophical theory of knowledge and delineates an empirical re-
search agenda for such a reconstruction of epistemology driven by a sociol-
ogy of knowledge of a revolutionary persuasion. Exploring the centrality of
social practice in the social determination of knowledge, the article argues
that, and shows how, a properly reflexive reconstruction of epistemology is
best achieved by deploying the sociology of knowledge in two complemen-
tary materialist directions: (1) a sociology of everyday social practices that il-
luminates our epistemic immersion in the carpentered environments of the
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socionatural order and (2) a sociology of craft that objectivates the social
constitution of the skhole` as a mode of existential boundedness by address-
ing scholarly thought as differentiated social labor.
Keywords: sociology of knowledge, epistemology, reflexivity
Sociologizing IR: The Turn That Tamed a Revolution
La science n’a pas la philosophie qu’elle me´rite.
(Bachelard 1953, 20)
Traditional philosophical epistemology . . .
has come to the end of its road.
(Elias 1982, 36)
Over the past few decades, the field of international relations (IR) has witnessed
an important transformation driven by an awakening to the historicity and social
situatedness of its knowledge and the desire to inscribe this awareness into its theo-
retical and methodological frameworks, practice, and ethos. To date, the sociological
turn carrying this reflexive agenda has failed to coherently extend the domain and
reach of the sociological understanding of knowledge to epistemology itself, thereby
preserving and reproducing the classical division of intellectual labor between sociol-
ogy and philosophy, whereby the understanding of the sociohistorically contingent
realities of knowledge and knowing has no bearing on the general epistemic catego-
ries and standards through which knowledge is defined, pursued, and evaluated.
In endorsing what this article will show to be an unsustainable division of labor,
the sociological turn has in effect undermined the full extension and conclusive
deployment of IR’s postpositivist and reflexive consciousness, by impeding the
advent of “the sociological revolution”: “the supersession of philosophy as such
and the reformulation of the problems once generated there onto another level
by sociology” (Kilminster 1998, 15). In the case of epistemology, this is manifested
as a failure to reconstruct the theory of knowledge as a social theory proper: a
general theoretical account of knowledge grounded in epistemography (Dear
2001), that is, in an empirical investigation that takes the ontological status of
knowledge seriously as a social phenomenon originating in the externality1 of so-
cial life, not in the imagined inner processes of an idealized universal mind.
While this article focuses on epistemology, its implications extend to all domains
falling within philosophy’s classical purview, including ontology and ethics. The
wider issue of IR’s relation to philosophy—specifically, to its idealist-normative pos-
ture—pertains to our endorsement of philosophers’ self-definition as “conceptual
trouble-shooters, arriving on the doorstep of the sciences . . . with a conceptual tool-
kit ready to tune up their theories” and “provide a rigorous, conceptual expertise in
the interest of clarification” (Kilminster 1998, 22). This peculiar, subordinated posi-
tion that denies us our epistemic autonomy and autonomous judgment is widely ac-
cepted as an orthodoxy within IR, as recently exemplified in Patrick Jackson’s influ-
ential The Conduct of Inquiry (Jackson 2011, 25) as well as in responses to it.
Jackson’s intervention is heroic in its systematic deployment and stretching of the
philosophical framework to accommodate all manifestations of IR’s postpositivist and
reflexive consciousness, including its growing sociological sensibility. But in buying
1I use the notions of externality and externalist analysis throughout as extensions of Durkheim’s conceptualiza-
tion of social phenomena as being external both to the individual manifestations of consciousness and to the men-
tal/psychological processes of the mind (Durkheim 1894).
The Sociology of Knowledge as Postphilosophical Epistemology4
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/article-abstract/20/1/3/4086540
by University of Cambridge user
on 07 March 2018
into philosophy’s clarifier role, it fails to notice its breaking point. This article travels
the path to, and beyond, this point by delineating an alternative epistemology that
properly embodies the critical and reconstructive potential of our newfound reflexiv-
ity. It thus challenges the notion that “the philosophy of IR” is not part of “our main
vocational task” (Jackson 2011, 17) and thereby takes us a step closer to establish
“the philosophy that [we] deserve” (Bachelard 1953, 20).
The philosophy we deserve is one whose categories and problematizations ade-
quately reflect our current understanding of the social world and of our knowledge
as an integral, dynamic part of that world; it is therefore a philosophy that
accompanies the sociohistorical transformations of our epistemic consciousness
and thereby transforms its own normative instruments on the basis of that evolving
social history. Before such a recursive, existentially grounded, and autonomous pro-
cess can replace the static, idealist, and heteronomous one currently defining the
rules of our epistemic thought and conduct, philosophy and epistemology first
have to be fully brought back into the social world to which they naturally belong.
While IR’s postpositivist turn was from the beginning informed by just such an in-
tuition, the disjunction between this intuition and our continuing practice of turning
to a priori philosophical standards to order and guide our understanding of knowl-
edge, science, and theory (Hamati-Ataya 2016) has prevented a conclusive formula-
tion/resolution of the problem of epistemic foundations that the relativist, historicist
critique has produced. In adopting a consistently naturalist perspective that focuses
on epistemology as the domain that best crystallizes this disjunction, this article aims
to illustrate what it would mean to reclaim the philosophy of IR as a coherent, autono-
mous, and critical endeavor, but also demonstrate that until this has been successfully
achieved—in actual practice—the postpositivist turn will remain incomplete, inconclu-
sive, impotent, and harmful to our epistemic aspirations and social role.
The article advances these objectives in two steps. The first, critical part begins
with a diagnostic effort to trace the history and erasure of the radical sociological po-
sition on knowledge in the connected evolutions of sociology and IR. My argument
here is that the derailing of the sociological revolution was paradoxically mediated by
the consolidation of social constructionism and science studies, reproduced in IR by
their counterparts in the sociological turn: constructivism and the sociology of IR.
In these otherwise reflexive developments, the progression of sociological rea-
son was halted by a dual process: (1) a self-imposed limitation on the systematic
extension of sociological analysis to all products and levels of thought, which has
prevented a reappropriation of epistemology as an object of sociological inquiry
and (2) the endorsement of an idealist and institutionalist ontology of the social
that has undermined the original, bold ambition of the sociology of knowledge,
namely, to explain the products of thought (including epistemology) as exogenously
constituted in the material processes of social life.
Following this analysis, I reformulate the radical sociological position through
the works of major theorists of the social determination of knowledge and distin-
guish two pathways of social determination (social production and social differentia-
tion) that produce epistemic consciousness through two kinds of existential
boundedness (Seinsgebundenheit and Seinsverbundenheit). This allows me to both
clarify the implications for IR of a transition to a postphilosophical theory of
knowledge and define an empirical research agenda for such a reconstruction of
epistemology driven by a sociology of knowledge of a revolutionary persuasion.
The second, reconstructive part of the article focuses on the latter objective by pro-
posing a concrete research program that revives the legacy of social-determination
theorists in the light of recent advances in sociological and philosophical research
whose implications for epistemology have not systematically been explored as such. I
first put forth social practice as the social phenomenon wherein the externalist and
materialist parameters of the social-determination thesis converge and crystallize con-
ceptually and empirically. Against current orientations in IR’s science studies and
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practice turns, I argue that empirical praxeology is the most cogent way of recon-
structing epistemology instead of ignoring it.
To demonstrate this, I develop in explicitly praxeological terms the two pathways
of social determination previously discussed and show how an empirically grounded
sociological reconstruction of epistemology requires the deployment of the sociology
of knowledge in two complementary materialist directions: (1) a sociology of every-
day social practices that illuminates our epistemic immersion in the carpentered envi-
ronments of the socionatural order and (2) a sociology of craft that objectivates the
social constitution of the skhole` as a specific mode of existential boundedness by ad-
dressing scholarly thought as differentiated social labor.
In my concluding remarks, I situate this reconstructive project in the context of
the shift from the politics of truth to the politics of untruth/‘post-truth’, which of-
fers postpositivists the challenge and opportunity to interrogate their ability to co-
herently inscribe a social defense of truth in a comprehensive understanding of
its social nature and social conditions of possibility.
The Sociology of Knowledge as Epistemology: On the Tracks of a Derailed
Revolution
Sociologists approach the problem of knowledge by interrogating the sociohistori-
cal variability and contingency of all manifestations of thought, conceived as “cul-
tural formations” (Mannheim 1982, 55) and treated as natural objects of reality
(Bloor 1976). The objective of the sociology of knowledge is to identify and ex-
plain the social origins (ontogenesis), conditions of possibility, and processes of
(re)production of our collective representations—(systems of) ideas, forms of
thought, and modes of thinking.
The first part of this article explains why the division of labor between (the)
sociology (of knowledge) and (the) philosophy (of knowledge/science) is untena-
ble, by showing (1) that the investigation of the social determination of knowl-
edge2 in effect reappropriates the philosophical problem of consciousness and of
the origins of the forms and categories of the understanding and (2) conse-
quently, that a coherent, full deployment of the sociology of knowledge necessar-
ily leads to a reconstruction of epistemology along postphilosophical lines.
To properly delineate and efficiently pursue such a project, however, requires
to first understand how such a reconstruction failed to occur in IR and what self-
imposed obstacles need to be removed for its achievement.
The Social-Determination Thesis in Eclipse and the Taming of Sociological Reason
The derailing of the radical inquiry into the social determination of knowledge
started soon after the official establishment of the sociology of knowledge (as
Wissenssoziologie) in Germany in the 1920s (Scheler 1980; Mannheim 1936) and
unofficially in France (as sociologie de la connaissance) a couple decades earlier
(Durkheim 1960; Durkheim and Mauss [1963] 1970). While even Robert Merton
recognized the foundational character of this problem for a proper sociology of
knowledge, his own contribution to the establishment and consolidation of the so-
ciology of science, as a discipline focused on the institutional factors governing
scientific organization and activity, led to the steady disappearance of the social-
determination concern until the constructionist turn in American social science.
By the time this turn occurred, the sociology of knowledge had been relegated
to a marginal space, delineated (i.e., excluded), on the one hand, by the
philosophical-normative investigation of “justified true belief” that constituted
2Social determination doesn’t imply or entail sociological determinism. The social determination of knowledge
points to those origins of knowledge that are social, not to the idea that knowledge is exclusively socially determined.
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the domain of classical-analytical epistemology (Fogelin 1994), and on the
other, by the sociological investigation of “certified public knowledge” as pur-
sued by the then-dominant sociology of science (Merton 1973).
The original concerns of the sociology of knowledge were thus narrowly and re-
sidually redefined in relation to what was excluded from the philosophical-
epistemological investigation of truth and would justify a sociological approach,
namely, false knowledge or opinion, associated with the theory of ideology
broadly construed. Indeed, the consensus was that only false knowledge (i.e., er-
ror) needed any sociological explanation, whereas true knowledge required no
grounding in social determinants, its validity being a sufficient explanation both
of its occurrence and of correct beliefs about its truth-value.
The constructionist turn of the 1960s provided the impetus for the reemergence
of the sociology of knowledge in the United States and the subsequent development
of an anti-Mertonian sociology of scientific knowledge in the United Kingdom.
Berger and Luckmann’s treatise ([1966] 1991), which introduced the idiom of the
social construction of (social) reality through a synthesis of French (Durkheimian)
and German (Weberian) sociological traditions, had a profound impact on the redef-
inition and subsequent trajectory of the field in Anglo-American sociology. Indeed, it
offered an explanatory framework that included social determination as part of the
coconstitution of subject and object, by reinstituting the origins of human represen-
tations as central to the investigation of social being and behavior.
However, this American intervention differed in two important ways from the
original European project. First, it focused on everyday knowledge without a spe-
cific concern for scholarly knowledge. The then-dominant sociology of science, on
the other hand, being exclusively interested in the hard and technical sciences,
this left social-scientific and philosophical knowledge in an ontological vacuum
that contrasted with its centrality for the original sociology of knowledge. Indeed,
the latter had envisaged itself as one instance of its object of study and was there-
fore conceived as an intrinsically reflexivist program that could (and did) speak
of its own social determination (Mannheim [1936] 2000a).
Second, the realm of reference for the social-determination thesis, namely, the
social, was now defined in cultural-institutional and ideational ways, leaving out of
coconstitution a whole set of material (ecological, biological, and economic) and
praxical3 determinants of knowledge that were originally central to the sociology
of knowledge. This ideationalist shift was consequential on two related levels. At
the theoretical level, the explanation of ideational phenomena by other ideational
phenomena distorted the externalist parameters of the sociology of knowledge,
thereby undermining its original, distinctive purpose, which is to explain the for-
mation and workings of consciousness as a socially (i.e., exogenously) constituted
product, not to map the interdependence of so-called inner products of con-
sciousness in their social (external) manifestations. At the metaepistemological
level, this shift inhibited the reconstructive potentialities of the sociological per-
spective, since there was no longer any reason to interrogate, let alone redefine,
the standards of epistemology outside of those traditional idealist categories
whose origins could be a priori located in the realm of mental (internal) pro-
cesses mediated by, and intersubjectively agreed upon via, other so-called products
of consciousness: logic and language.
Because social constructionism has affected all the social sciences, these related
transformations have resulted in a taming of the sociological revolution across the
board, (i.e., an erasure of its postphilosophical radicalism and self-acclaimed au-
tonomy in matters of epistemology). Its failure to inform critical and reflexive
scholarship is most strikingly illustrated by the fact that its most eloquent
3I use praxical to refer to praxis/practice rather than to either practicality or practicability, for which I reserve
the term practical.
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proponents—Marx (1978), Elias (1971a, b), Bourdieu (1983, 1990a), Bourdieu
et al. (1968)—are among the most influential sociologists and social theorists of
the last century. How is it, then, that while even today Marxian, Eliasian, and
Bourdieusian sociologies thrive, especially within postpositivist (IR) circles, their
passionate, even bellicose, anti-idealist/postphilosophical positions on epistemol-
ogy are largely ignored?
The sociological revolution was deflated not so much by philosophers, who
were taking stock of the philosophical crisis provoked by advances in historical
and social-scientific inquiry, but by sociologists who accepted and reasserted the
traditional division of labor between the two disciplines—and this is where the les-
sons for IR begin to unfold. The taming of sociological radicalism was mediated
by such authoritative interventions as Giddens’ (1984) The Constitution of Society
and Berger and Luckmann’s own The Social Construction of Reality (Berger and
Luckmann [1966] 1991): two seminal texts of Anglo-American sociology and the
two bibles of Anglo-American constructionism.
The earlier intervention sums up well the somewhat gratuitous reverence for philo-
sophical inquiry and its “time-honoured intellectual territory” (Berger and
Luckmann [1966] 1991, 13) (ontology and epistemology) characterizing the now-
leading constructionist position—and to avoid any misunderstanding and outrage, it
does so on the very first page of the book’s introduction; with respect to questions
about the ultimate status of reality and knowledge, the sociologist’s intrusion is
likely to raise the eyebrows of the man in the street and even more likely to enrage
the philosopher. It is, therefore, important that . . . we immediately disclaim any pre-
tension to the effect that sociology has an answer to these ancient philosophical pre-
occupations. (Berger and Luckmann [1966] 1991, 13)
This was perhaps merely a cautious attempt by two Austrian-born scholars to
preempt well-rehearsed attacks on the sociology of knowledge, in a country that
had just started to engage European continental theories (many of which, like the
Frankfurt School’s, were opposed to the project anyway) and where German
Wissenssoziologie had found no philosophical allies besides pragmatists who
adopted a “genetic” approach to knowledge (Lavine 1950, 538). But regardless of
original intentions, these self-imposed taboos on sociological thinking and cri-
tique prevailed, despite sociology’s natural vocation to raise eyebrows precisely by
challenging everyday commonsense and despite such taboos’ nonsensical implica-
tions for other ancient questions that fall within the ‘time-honoured intellectual
territory’ of, say, metaphysical or theological inquiry. Not only were sociologists
refused the legitimacy to answer philosophical questions about knowledge and re-
ality, the reverential posture also evaded the possibility that, as the realities of
knowledge became illuminated sociologically and thereby made to recursively in-
form problematizations of knowledge and knowing, these ancient questions would
be rendered—or shown to always have been—properly meaningless.
These two shifts operated by Anglo-American social constructionism—away
from the critical inquiry into (social-)scientific and philosophical knowledge and
toward an idealist ontology of the social—are an extension of the failure of nerve
that David Bloor (1976) identified in Karl Mannheim’s own self-imposed limita-
tions on the types of knowledge whose truths Wissenssoziologie could (cultural sci-
ences) and could not (physical and mathematical sciences, logic, epistemology)
subject to sociological analysis. Both of these shifts—and, I suggest, a similar fail-
ure of nerve—have played out in IR’s sociological turn via constructivism, but fol-
lowing two variants representing the diverging (Anglo-American vs. European)
legacies of IR’s constructivists.
The two variants, sometimes identified as conventional and critical versions of
constructivism (Hopf 1998), are easily differentiated by the extent to which they
allow the reflexivity of social actors, as knowing subjects, to have epistemological
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implications for constructivism itself. In conventional constructivism, best repre-
sented by Alexander Wendt’s (1999) work, just as in Giddens’ (1984) and Berger
and Luckmann’s ([1966] 1991), the sociology of knowledge is adopted as the
scholar’s standpoint on other social actors’ knowledge, but not her own. The in-
fluential development of this peculiar version of the sociological turn prompted
the affirmation of a critical constructivism that took a more coherent position on
knowledge. In Stefano Guzzini’s (2000, 149) equally influential intervention, tak-
ing the sociological turn seriously entails problematizing “the relationship
between the social world and the social construction of meaning (including
[scholarly] knowledge).”
However, critical constructivism has so far limited the scope of this problemat-
ization in two significant ways. First, while coherently addressing the implications
of the social construction of meaning for our understanding of theory and its con-
ceptual elements conceived as intersubjective phenomena of the social world, it
has not extended this same posture to epistemology and philosophy, which presum-
ably belong to the same class of ideational phenomena whose meaning is socially
(intersubjectively) constructed. The failure to logically and critically take this one
simple, additional step and carry the constructionist agenda empirically all the
way up has perhaps single-handedly delayed the formulation of a coherent post-
foundationalist philosophy in IR. Second, the conceptualization of the social in
the two terms of the relationship—the social world and the social construction
of meaning—is very clearly exclusive of material structures and processes (inan-
imate, biological, ecological, and economic) that provide the stuff and the con-
ditions of possibility of social structures and processes, and thereby enable and
mediate social construction.
The final result is a social constructionism that doesn’t trickle its epistemology
either up or down and leaves the upper branches of the social as unexplored as
its deep roots. In complete opposition to the transgressive attitude of the original
sociology of knowledge, critical constructivism rather appears as the product of a
self-limiting boundary work that keeps sociological critique gently within the (so-
cially constructed) borders separating it from the sovereign realms of philosophy
and the noncultural sciences, and reproduces a (socially constructed) idealism
that it denies itself the means of critically interrogating.
The clearest illustration of critical constructivism’s softening of the sociology of
knowledge is that it renders the latter barely distinguishable from alternative
sociohistorical perspectives that now inform a growing contextualist agenda
within IR (Roshchin 2014), such as Nietzschean-Foucauldian, Skinnerian, and
Koselleckian inquiries into the formation of IR thought/theory and its driving
concepts (compare Bartelson [1995], Armitage [2000], Jahn [2006], Guzzini
[2013], Ashworth [2014], Berenskoetter [2016]). Simultaneously, the contagious
sociologizing gaze of the sociological turn has brought the discipline’s intellectual
historians and historiographers so much closer to that soft sociology of knowledge
that they should rightly be considered an integral part of that turn. While this has
undoubtedly widened and enriched the conversation about IR, the radicalism of
the sociological perspective—its distinctive theoretical-explanatory ambitions and
its aspirations for philosophical autonomy—has now been diluted in this sea of
weakly differentiated contextualizing discourse.
The second path that has paradoxically contributed to the further erasure of
the radical-sociological perspective in IR is the growing science studies agenda.
This agenda reflects the various influences of the sociology of science and, more
recently, of science and technology studies (STS) as its heir and as the site of a
reformulation of constructionism via laboratory studies. The first area of influ-
ence is manifested in IR scholars’ straightforward appropriation of STS’s subject-
matter on the basis of its obvious importance in world politics (Mayer et al. 2014).
The recent creation of a Science, Technology and Art in International Relations
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(STAIR) section at the International Studies Association marks the institutionali-
zation of this agenda, which is confidently growing away from abstract epistemo-
logical debates.
The second area of influence represents the reflexivist appeal of science studies
insofar as they illuminate the realities of scholarly representations and practices
for scholars themselves. Here, IR’s appropriation of STS’s theories and methodologies
has required some extension of STS’s object-domain. Indeed, STS’s core focus on
the hard and technical sciences (the founding case-studies being high-energy
physics, molecular biology, and colloid chemistry) and its simultaneous transla-
tion of the social-constructionist interest in everyday knowledge into the everyday
of laboratory life, have again left social-scientific and philosophical knowledge in
an ontological vacuum. Even today, most sociological studies of that knowledge,
such as the sociology of philosophy (Collins 1998), the sociology of sociology
(Bourdieu 2001), the sociology of economics (Fourcade 2009), and the sociology
of IR, are at most (if at all) informed by STS scholarship but essentially developed
outside of STS.
In the case of IR, however (and as opposed to the sociology of sociology), this
appropriation endorsed the same narrowing of sociological and reflexivist inquiry
that occurred in STS, for which the facts about scholarly knowledge and practice
have not triggered a redefinition of epistemology. The sociological research
agenda that Ole Wæver proposed in his (Wæver 1998) article has now crystallized
as a somewhat constructionist version of a Mertonian sociology of IR-as-science,
only more nuanced, and speaking the languages of the post-third-debate era
wherein criticality demands fluency in postpositivism and an engagement with
gendered and (post)colonial realities (a synthesis best achieved to date in Tickner
and Wæver [2009] and Tickner and Blaney [2012]). Beyond its acknowledgment
of the critical canon, however, the sociology of IR is increasingly anchoring the so-
ciological and reflexive turns in the study of institutional structures and processes
(made explicit in Grenier [2015]) ranging from academic interactions to publica-
tions, curricula, and public engagement (Hagmann and Biersteker 2014;
Kristensen 2015; Turton 2016; Grenier and Hagmann 2016; Alejandro forthcom-
ing). Additionally, the sophisticated focus on scholars’ practices underscoring this
sociological project is explicitly promoted as a move away from IR’s traditional,
unproductive obsessions with epistemology (Bueger 2012).
Finally, STS’s influence in IR is unlikely to mediate a future engagement with
the bolder ambitions of the sociology of knowledge. STS theorists’ move from so-
cial constructionism to the “co-production of nature and the social order”
(Jasanoff [2004] 2006a), which manifests a “self-conscious desire to avoid both so-
cial and technoscientific determinism” (Jasanoff [2004] 2006b, 20), does not pro-
vide any clear delineation of the social determination of knowledge.
Coproduction is understood in terms of “the ordering of nature through science
and technology” and “the ordering of society through power and culture”
(Jasanoff [2004] 2006b, 14; Miller [2004] 2006, 65). This has diluted, in theory
and practice, the investigation of different modalities of the recursive ordering of
culture (including knowledge and thought).
Indeed, a comprehensive account of the co-production of nature and culture
would address the natural (physiological, ecological) conditions and determinants
of knowledge and how social interaction and collective emotional and learning
experiences in turn (re)shape the biological and genetic determinants of human
cognition. A complete reflexivist theory of knowledge would therefore encompass
natural/naturalized epistemology (Quine 1969) and social/socialized epistemol-
ogy (Fuller 1988) conjointly. This article focuses exclusively on the latter ap-
proach, while providing (in part two) some illustration of how the sociology of
knowledge can incorporate elements of natural epistemology through a study of
the socially transformed ecologies of human perception and understanding.
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The revival of the social-determination thesis is especially important because
IR’s dominant versions of social constructionism have by and large reduced
the social to a free-floating realm of the ideational (language, norms, identity,
etc.), and material factors are ignored as necessary determinants of epistemic
categories and representations. Since this tendency extends to postpositivist
approaches more generally, we are basically left with the tacit paradigmatic
proposition according to which the ideational begets the ideational—ideas
produce more ideas, language shapes meanings and perceptions, culture in-
forms norms, etc. This, however, does not in any way explain why and how
(any of these) ideational products are possible in the first place (the general
formulation), or how macrotransformations in social organization and (re)pro-
duction affect the frames through which social reality is intersubjectively ren-
dered intelligible and meaningful (the specific formulation). And without
such explanations being explicitly envisaged and systematically pursued, the so-
ciology of knowledge is at best reduced to a mere sociologically inclined his-
tory of ideas.
Epistemology as Social Theory: Theorizing Social Determination
The sociological critique of philosophical epistemology began more than
150 years ago. Before presenting it here, it is useful to start with the soft version of
the sociology of knowledge, which has had the greatest impact on Western scholar-
ship and IR, namely, Karl Mannheim’s4. Mannheim (1936, 56) defined
Wissenssoziologie as the study of “total ideology” understood as the “total structure of
the mind” of “an age or of a concrete historico-social group.” The sociology of
knowledge reflexively explains itself as the concretization of the historicist
Weltanschauung (“global outlook of an epoch”) (Mannheim [1936] 2000a, c), which
reflects a maturation of the “unmasking turn of mind” that characterizes sociologi-
cal thought (Mannheim [1936] 2000a, c). It originates in the realization that since
“Weltanschauungen are not produced by thinking,” they should be subjected to an
objective and scientific, rather than idealist, inquiry (Mannheim [1936] 2000b,
37–38). This inquiry is part of a broader sociology of thought that entails “breaking
through the immanence of thought—with an attempt to comprehend thought as a
partial phenomenon within the broader field of existence, and to determine it, as
it were, starting from existential data” (Mannheim [1936] 2000a, 138).
Mannheim’s study of conservatism demonstrates how “thinking is bound to ex-
istence” (Mannheim 1986, 31), that is, how knowledge and thought are (1) exis-
tentially bound (seinsgebunden) to the entire context of social production and sociali-
zation that determines their possibility, meaning, and truth-value and (2)
existentially connected (seinsverbunden) to specific social groups whose distinctive-
ness arises out of social differentiation. As opposed to Mannheim, radical sociolo-
gists deployed this analysis to include all types of knowledge and thought, track-
ing one or both of these two pathways of social determination in their furthest
and most material extensions. This deployment entailed an explicit confrontation
with philosophy, manifesting the self-conscious evolution of sociological thought
following Auguste Comte’s “positive” revolution.
The Marxian-Engelsian critique of German idealism is one of the earliest for-
mulations of the radical position. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels
illustrate the posture exemplified by their historical method in presenting the
contents and forms of human consciousness as products in and of the processes
of human material existence, defining ideology as a socially produced distortion of
our perception of reality:
4Especially the influence of Ideology and Utopia on Carr, who “twisted its rhetorical structure almost out of recog-
nition” (Jones 1997, 236) and Morgenthau.
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Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.—real, active men, as they
are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the in-
tercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never
be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual
life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in
a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-
process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process
. . . (Marx and Engels 1978, 154)
While “consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product, and re-
mains so as long as men exist at all” (Marx and Engels 1978, 158), what lends
socioepistemic power and credence to ideology is that the forms and modes of think-
ing through which ideas are posited as independently real, and consciousness as au-
tonomous from social life-processes, are themselves the (ideological) product of
material existence, emerging when the division of social labor takes its ultimate form,
that is, once manual and mental labor become separated in the process of production:
From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something
other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something
without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to
emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of “pure” theory,
theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. (Marx and Engels 1978, 159).
In Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law, and beyond it, of all products of
mental labor, the materialist posture is crystallized in the now-paradigmatic thesis
according to which the “mode of production of material life conditions the social,
political, and intellectual life process in general” and hence that “[i]t is not the
consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary their social
being that determines their consciousness” (Marx 1978, 4).
The original excerpts were worth reproducing here to remind the reader that
the Marxian critique of ideology applies to the entire process and phenomenon of
ideation. Its implications for epistemology are best captured by the analysis of the
origins of abstract and conceptual thought, as delineated by George Thomson
([1955] 1977) in The First Philosophers and pursued by Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1978)
in his Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology.
Thomson ([1955] 1977, 300) noted that
[a]s we pass from Thales to Anaximander and Anaximenes, from the Milesians to
Pythagoras and Herakleitos and finally to Parmenides, we find the concept of matter
becoming progressively less qualitative and concrete, until Parmenides confronts us
with a pure abstraction, timeless and absolute.
Remarking that “the society in which these philosophers lived and worked was
characterized by the rapid growth of a monetary economy,” Thomson proposed
that “[t]he Parmenidean One, together with the later idea of ‘substance,’ may
therefore be described as a reflex or projection of the substance of exchange
value” (Thomson [1955] 1977, 300, 301).
Sohn-Rethel (1978, [1961] 2010) systematically explored this hypothesis with
respect to the history of philosophy up to Kant and the birth of modern science.
Drawing on Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism, Sohn-Rethel replaced Marx’s
concepts of use-value and exchange-value with those of use-activity and exchange-
activity. In commodity production and circulation, the two types of activity (i.e.,
practice) are separated in time and space, the marketplace being a transitory realm
between production and use wherein the exchange-value of commodities takes
precedence over their use-value. Once commodities are no longer exchanged for
one another through barter but via a universal equivalent (money), abstraction
becomes a defining component of men’s social relations. In causally connecting
the birth of abstract thought to that of exchange-abstraction and the emergence
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of the concept of movement in Galilean Physics to the movement of monetary cir-
culation, Sohn-Rethel illustrates how it is in humans’ practice, not in their
thought, that theoretical forms and categories originate:
[O]ur concepts . . . are not properties of things that . . . we would read in them.
Quite the contrary, the conceptual apparatus that we apply to things is part of us,
but this ‘part of us’ is to be understood in both a social and historical sense; it is not
individual, and it does not come from nature . . . [T]hese pure concepts . . . are re-
lated to the conscious elimination of society in the act of thinking . . . they are . . .
that which remains once one has completely abstracted the social (Sohn-Rethel
[1961] 2010, 40)5.
The conclusion that idealist-philosophical epistemology is the product of a social
process whereby the social nature and externality of consciousness are made invisi-
ble to consciousness was also established in Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss’s
functionalist analysis of collective representations. Their 1903 study of primitive
forms of classification (Durkheim and Mauss [1963] 1970) laid the ground for a re-
alist understanding of the social origins and constitution of philosophical catego-
ries such as time and space. These were shown to result from the ordering of the
world that is produced in the course of a social group’s interaction with nature and
the organization of its physical environment and everyday activity.
Crucially, in Durkheim’s (1960) study of the elementary forms of religious life,
based on ethnographies of totemic Australian societies, the philosophers’ cate-
gory of category is itself appropriated sociologically and subjected to a naturalist
analysis. By illuminating the logic and process according to which humans, ani-
mals, and inanimate objects are brought together into totemic groups, Durkheim
shows that while the act of classifying implies the human faculty to classify, (i.e., es-
tablish relations of resemblances and identity among things), the principle accord-
ing to which these associations are made is completely external to consciousness;
it is the social organization of the group that provides the model for a conceptual
ordered grouping wherein items are placed in a relation of parenthood vis-a-vis
one another (Durkheim 1960, 200–22). Durkheim’s analysis thus demonstrates
the determining role of social organization and practice in the emergence and
sociomental fixation of intersubjective epistemic categories within society and in
each of its members’ mind.
Durkheim’s study further demonstrates “how the most diverse techniques and
practices (law, morality, arts) and those that serve material life (sciences of nature,
industrial techniques) are, directly or indirectly” derived from religious practice
and thought and inherit its original forms (Durkheim 1960, 319–20). The
metaepistemological implications of the erasure of this genealogy in the constitu-
tion of philosophical and (social-)scientific thought are most strikingly illustrated
in his analysis of the concepts of force (and by extension, power) (Durkheim
1960, 268–292) and causality (Durkheim 1960, 501-28)—another a priori category
of Kantian philosophy—whose origins are identified, respectively, in the magical
representations of totemism and in the practices of mimetic (or imitative) totemic
rituals.
The radical sociological position finds another powerful formulation in Max
Scheler’s phenomenological contribution, which is the first explicit demarcation
of the sociology of knowledge as an autonomous discipline, and the first system-
atic, comprehensive sociological treatment of the problem of knowledge. The so-
ciology of knowledge is here again asserted against philosophy’s idealism (Scheler
1980, 38), being conceived as the investigation of the “temporal coming-to-be” of
“ideal factors” that constitute the domain of culture (religion, metaphysics, sci-
ence, art, and law) on the basis of the “relationships and forms” of “real factors”
5Quotes from French sources are translations by the author throughout.
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of social life, the most important of which are the economy, power, and reproduc-
tion (Scheler 1980, 36).
It is impossible to capture the extraordinary sophistication, vision, and scope of
Scheler’s enterprise in a few paragraphs, but its core propositions are clear
enough for the purpose at hand. For Scheler, different types of knowledge have
different origins and are carried by different social groups and their associated
ethos. They are all constituted by the effects of diverse material causes, starting
from natural factors associated with a universal “innate drive impulse” to “con-
struct and play” that is released by “[e]verything unfamiliar . . . that disrupts the
context of immediate, interconnected anticipations” (Scheler 1980, 77). Two
layers of social factors explain the differentiation of epistemic standpoints and
their constitutive intellectual orientations. These factors are related to humans’
interaction with their environment and to their socioeconomic organization.
Scheler assigns the most significant impact of socioecological factors on the dif-
ferentiated cultural evolution of metaphysics, wherein differences in perspectives
reflect different existential immersions in the world, which produce specific con-
ceptions of the self and of how self and world are related to each other. Whereas
“Asian Indian metaphysics is one of ‘forests’ . . . one of immediate contact with na-
ture, of identification with and immersion of the soul in life, . . . by contrast almost
the entire metaphysics of the West is a product of city thinking.” While the former
thereby produces an “almost metaphysical-democratic conscious unity of man
with all subhuman life,” the latter translates as a consciousness wherein man views
himself as “a sovereign being above all of nature” (Scheler 1980, 98). It is within
such metaphysical schisms that socioeconomic factors operate as a third source of
external determination, explaining differences in content and form among
Western philosophies (French, British, and German) as deriving from the charac-
teristics and ethos of the social groups that produced them (respectively, the “en-
lightened nobility,” the ”larger bourgeoisie . . . [of] statesmen and economists,”
and “the learned Protestant middleclass”) (Scheler 1980, 98–99).
But social determination operates along different pathways that reflect the so-
cial differentiation of mental and manual labor. The social determination of phi-
losophy is mediated by “the work of learned people of the upper classes who have
the leisure to contemplate essences and to devote themselves to their own ‘cultiva-
tion’” (Scheler 1980, 100). While this existential distance from the material pro-
cesses of social life is necessary and sufficient for the development of metaphysical
knowledge, it cannot, however, account for the emergence of positive knowledge,
whose “basic sociological origins” are “always economic communities of work and com-
merce.” Science originates in the ethos of those whose immersion in the life-
process shapes their consciousness and inner drive in the direction of an “inten-
sive interest in those images of and thought about nature that make possible the
prediction of natural processes and control over them.” This is the “class of people
who have accumulated experience in work and crafts,” and without whose praxis
“science never would have found its essential and close connection with technology,
measurement, and, later on, free experiment” (Scheler 1980, 100).
Insofar as science is the meeting of theoretical and practical knowledge, it is al-
ways and everywhere “the child of the marriage between philosophy and work-ex-
perience” (Scheler 1980, 100–01). But against the learned classes’ idealist episte-
mology, the sociology of knowledge illuminates the praxical nature and becoming
of science:
technology is not a subsequent “application” of a theoretical, contemplative science
characterized by the idea of truth, observation, conservation, pure logic, and mathe-
matics; rather, the more or less prevailing will to control and direct this or that
realm of existence (gods, souls, society, organic and inorganic nature) co-
determines the methods of thought and intuition, as well as the goals of scientific
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thought, and, indeed, it co-determines as though behind the back of the conscious-
ness of individuals, whose changing motivations for investigation do not matter in
this process. (Scheler 1980, 101).
In Pierre Bourdieu’s constructivist structuralism or structuralist constructivism
(Bourdieu 1989) the sociohistorical differentiation of social labor and the conse-
quent social constitution of theoretical thought are further specified as being me-
diated and consecrated by the constitution of a social group whose worldview is
shaped by a specific mode of existential boundedness—the skhole`—that is exem-
plified, (re)produced, and legitimated through a socially organized and institu-
tionally validated collective practice, intersubjectively experienced as a distinctive
vocation and ethos:
The scholastic view is a very peculiar point of view [on the world] . . . that is made
possible by the situation of skhole`, of leisure, of which the school . . . is a particular
form, as an institutionalized situation of studious leisure. Adopting this scholastic
point of view is the admission fee, the custom right tacitly demanded by all scholarly
fields . . . (Bourdieu 1990a, 381).
Insofar as what “those whose profession it is to think and/or speak about the
world have the most chance of overlooking are the social presuppositions that are
inscribed in the scholastic point of view,” reflexivity entails interrogating the social
conditions of possibility of this collective standpoint and “the unconscious disposi-
tions, productive of unconscious theses, which are acquired through an academic
or scholastic experience, often inscribed in prolongation of an originary (bour-
geois) experience of distance from the world and from the urgency of necessity”
(Bourdieu 1990a, 381). Therefore—and as a final sociological explanation of the
division of intellectual labor between sociology and philosophy—
[w]e must, by taking historicist reduction to its logical conclusion, seek the origins
of reason not in a human “faculty,” that is, a nature, but in the very history of these
peculiar social microcosms in which agents struggle, in the name of the universal,
for the legitimate monopoly over the universal, and in the progressive institutionali-
zation of a dialogical language which owes its seemingly intrinsic properties to the
social conditions of its genesis and of its utilization. (Bourdieu 1990a, 389)
This overview of the radical sociological position brought out the centrality of
social practices in the theorization of social determination. Before developing this
position into an empirical research agenda that further explores the two pathways
of social determination (social production and social differentiation) that consti-
tute collective consciousness as dually existentially bounded (seinsgebunden and
seinsverbunden), it is important to spell out its implications for a critique and re-
construction of epistemology in IR.
Implications for IR: Problematizing Knowledge before IR Theory, above the Philosophy of Science
If the sociology of knowledge necessarily disturbs the foundations of classical epis-
temology, it is because it naturally constitutes itself as an alternative perspective
on the philosophical categories and universals. First, because, it does not take for
granted the first assumptions through which philosophy operates as a prism (the
clarifier role) or a foundation (the arbiter role) for all fields of inquiry. As
Mannheim puts it, while
philosophy tends to ground itself upon a timeless and unchanging reason, or at
least to presuppose the unchangeability of the formal determinants of reason (espe-
cially of the categories), the sociology of knowledge, as an empirical specialised sci-
ence, is not allowed to accept such a postulate as binding upon itself. These problems
are questions for its factual inquiries (Mannheim 1986, 33; italics added).
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The implications of this statement were clear for Mannheim ([1936] 2000a) re-
gardless of his shyness about them; as the sociology of knowledge pursues its proj-
ect empirically and brings to light the social determination of the categories them-
selves, it simultaneously delineates an alternative epistemology—one which, as
opposed to philosophical epistemology, is constituted from the bottom up and
from the outside in.
Consequently, as Durkheim demonstrates, a sociological approach to collective
representations brings philosophy itself into the object-domain of the sociology of
knowledge. This is best exemplified with respect to the debate between philo-
sophical empiricists and rationalists about the origins of the categories them-
selves—a debate that the sociological approach resolves by explaining its occurrence
and the dualism of its form. To claim that the categories are the product of pure
experience (empiricism) is to ignore their universality and necessity (i.e., the fact
that one cannot willfully escape from them and reinvent them as one wishes). But
to claim that they are innate and external to all experience (rationalism) is to
place them outside of objective reality; the concept of a universal reason really
does not answer the question about the origins of these categories or account for
their variability across time. It is, rather, their social character that explains their
necessity and hence their objectivity as grounded in “the [social] nature of things”
(Durkheim 1960, 23–24).
The sociological perspective thus highlights the fact that by separating “the
product of thinking” from its “sociological genesis” and consequently anchoring
epistemology in “the level of immanent entities” (Mannheim 1986, 31) the
idealist-philosophical approach merely confuses ontological objectivity with time-
lessness (Mannheim 1982, 74) and thereby completely misses the nature, origins,
and causes of objectivity. If the categories are both universal and contingent, it is
because they are—exactly, no more, no less—sociohistorically objective. This, IR
scholars of a postpositivist persuasion have accepted as a reasonable proposition
with respect to theories and statements about the world, but somehow the impli-
cations of the principles of social-constructedness and historicity have never suffi-
ciently trickled up to affect the philosophical frameworks that in turn govern IR’s
metatheoretical discussions.
The more profound implications for IR, then, concern the ontological and
epistemological universals that anchor our authority to speak about the world:
those pertaining to the world’s existence and nature and to our modes of know-
ing it. These include but precede any discussions and debates we might have about
the international or whatever constitutes our subject-matter. In other words, the
problem of knowledge cannot be addressed (e.g., see EJIR 2013) at the level of
(better) IR theories or in the intertextual spaces of their agreements or opposi-
tions, because the social determinants of thought have already affected the frame-
works through which theories are constituted, rendered meaningful, and debated.
It is therefore not merely insufficient, but actually counterproductive, to mobilize
the sociology of knowledge for an epistemological reconstruction of IR theories
and concepts (Guzzini 2000) without first deploying it for a metaepistemological
reconstruction of epistemology itself. And it is in this sense that the sociological
turn carried by critical constructivism has a paradoxical sabotaging effect despite
its reflexive purpose and character.
Nor, then, can the problem be addressed (e.g., see Jackson 2011), even less so
resolved, within/through the philosophy of science, until the social determinants of
its categories and validating standards have been rigorously exposed and critically
interrogated, so they can become truly meaningful and useful as sociocognitive in-
struments. But this, of course, would produce a very different philosophy for IR
than the one we’ve been following for a century now: a new philosophy manifest-
ing and translating the historical (i.e., cumulative and self-corrective) progression
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of sociological reason, that is, the philosophy of a non-self-deceiving autonomy
suited to a properly post-Kantian consciousness.
To sum up, the superiority of the sociological position lies in its ability to en-
gage the problem of knowledge at the metaphilosophical level and thereby coher-
ently reconcile objectivity and historicity, by explaining the appearances of universality
as manifestations of the contingently objectivizing effect of social determination. Crucially,
it also identifies the social process whereby such appearances gain the socioepiste-
mological credibility of their objectivity, namely, the praxically mediated social consti-
tution of theoretical thought. This is the central thread running through the perspec-
tives presented above, and it is by exploring it systematically and empirically that
we can achieve a reconstruction of epistemology in IR.
The second part of this article accordingly moves on to an elaboration of the
requisites for such a reconstruction. The question of IR’s categories is here ad-
dressed in the terms that befit a metaepistemological inquiry concerned, not with
specific theories and objects, but with the modes and frames of knowing that me-
diate and enable scholarly knowledge and its distinctive standpoint on the world.
Practice as Mediation and Site of the Social: Outline for a Praxiographic
Investigation of Scholarly Thought
As shown earlier, practice emerges as the social phenomenon wherein the theo-
retical and ontological concerns of the social-determination thesis converge and
crystallize, thereby delineating a path for a further exploration of that thesis.
Conceptually practice connects, and simultaneously transcends the dichotomies
of, the external and the internal, the social and the individual, and the material
and the ideational. It can thus be understood as that which mediates between the
socionatural order and human consciousness. Consequently and methodologi-
cally, practice can be treated as the site of the social in the individual and hence
provides an anchoring for actual empirical research, that is, for a praxiography
specifically (Mol 2002; Bueger 2014).
However, contra the dominant orientation in the sociology of IR, the sociologi-
cal study of collective consciousness presented above indicates that scientific and
academic practices are not the only or most relevant social practices to explore,
even for the investigation of philosophical and social-scientific knowledge. The
following sections propose a more adequate and comprehensive approach that re-
flects a deeper engagement with the metaepistemological significance of
praxeology.
Praxeology
Keeping in mind the various ways that praxis and practice(s) are conceptualized
(Bueger and Gadinger 2014; Kustermans 2016), this section outlines core tenets
of the praxeological approach that are directly relevant to the problem at hand
and that open up a different space for the practice turn. While some pioneers of
this turn in IR explicitly envisage it as a move away from epistemology to practice
(Bueger 2012)—thereby enabling the sociological turn as the saboteur of the so-
ciological revolution—my argument is that praxeology is actually a means for rede-
fining epistemology sociologically and that it is the most efficient (and potentially
the only) means for doing so in an empirically conclusive manner.
This different take on praxeology implies a reversal of the relation between
knowledge and practice; instead of practices being merely conceived as manifesta-
tions that “embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and dis-
course in and on the material world” (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 4), they are here
(also, but mainly) understood as manifestations that embody and mediate the
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expression of the material world in and through the actualization of knowledge.
Within this framing, praxeology carries distinctive positions that are especially rel-
evant to an epistemography of IR.
First, practice theorists endorse a materialism that focuses on the body as “the
meeting point both of mind and activity and of individual activity and social mani-
fold” (Schatzki 2001, 8). This reverses the idealism of classical epistemology:
This prioritization of practices over mind brings with it a transformed conception of
knowledge . . . [K]nowledge (and truth) are no longer automatically self-transparent
possessions of minds. Rather, knowledge and truth, including the scientific versions,
are mediated both by interactions between people and by arrangements in the
world . . . Scientific and other knowledges also no longer amount to stockpiled rep-
resentations. Not only do practical understandings, ways of proceeding, and even
setups of the material environment represent forms of knowledge—propositional
knowledge presupposes and depends on them. (Schatzki 2001, 12)
Second, this entails acknowledging the two performative dimensions of prac-
tice. Practice should not only be conceived as a more or less passive performance
of collective representations that offers the observer an insight into individuals’
immersion in the social order to whose structural reproduction they contribute. It
should be understood simultaneously as the medium of an active response to
macrostructural processes of social life and the locus of a microresistance to social
structures and dynamics of order, discipline, and control (de Certeau [1980]
1990). A nonindividualist investigation of individuals’ practices can therefore cap-
ture, in their reproductive and subversive dimensions, the overall social dynamics
of collective order-(re)making.
Praxiography offers an insight into these social dynamics that is unmediated
and hence unobstructed by the layers of meaning we constantly produce in our in-
tellectual and moral engagement with the social order and that render our objec-
tive grounding in it more opaque to the observer. A praxiographic investigation
of social determination therefore provides a fruitful alternative to the contextual-
discursive analysis—as practiced by historians of ideas—of such hyperdisciplined
and overly constructed material as scholarly texts. It thereby constitutes an apt ap-
plication of Mannheim’s ([1936] 2000b, 38–39) principle for the unmasking of
Weltanschauungen, since it avoids the trap of starting from their “most remote
manifestations” (i.e., the forms wherein they are already theorized and overratio-
nalized, and hence most masked).
With these points in mind, each of the following sections explores one of the
two pathways of social determination identified by social-determination theorists,
with a view of formulating an empirical research agenda for a reconstruction of
epistemology driven by a sociology of knowledge of a revolutionary persuasion. In
each section, I develop my position against the backdrop of dominant praxeologi-
cal and philosophical perspectives to make explicit the shifts it entails.
From Laboratory Life to Everyday Life
The epistemological tenets of social constructionism and the methodological te-
nets of praxiography emerged, as intrinsically coconstitutive, out of laboratory
studies (Latour and Woolgar 1979; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Zenzen and Restivo 1982;
Lynch 1985; Traweek 1988). Laboratory studies operated a series of interrelated,
salutary moves vis-a-vis classical history and philosophy of science: from an ab-
stract universal model of science to the realities of actual, evolving sciences; from his-
torical, stock-taking analyses of “established knowledge” and “already-made
science” to contemporaneous studies of “unfinished knowledge” and “science in
action”; from the normative evaluation of scientific propositions via a priori stan-
dards of truth and validity to the investigation of the social formation of these
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standards in scientific activity; and consequently, from a focus on the context of
justification to a focus on the context of discovery and the actual relations be-
tween them. The laboratory provided a temporal and spatial localization for which
ethnographic observation became the method to investigate “the construction of
knowledge” and subsequently “the construction of the machineries of knowledge
construction” (Knorr-Cetina 1999, 3). From there, historical analysis was reintro-
duced by extending the ethnographic method from the unmediated observation
of contemporaneous scientific activity to the reconstitution of past socioscientific
processes of truth-making (Shapin and Schaffer 1985).
Although laboratory studies have originally been applied to the (experimental)
hard sciences, there are no fundamental restrictions on their extension to the so-
cial sciences and humanities. This merely requires adapting localization to the
physical, relational, institutional, and discursive spaces wherein scholarly practices
are conducted and enacted—the field, the office, the classroom, the conference,
the home, as well as loci of debate, controversy, and myth-making, or the sites
where authority, recognition, and discipline are performed. The tradition of
scholars writing about their practices autobiographically or drawing on them to
advise on the craft of intellectual and academic life (Mills [1959] 2000, Becker
[1986] 2007, Wildavsky [1993] 2010) is merely an informal, undertheorized
version of such a laboratory approach to our most consciously (individually) per-
formed practices. Today it has become theorized and extended to a range of col-
lective ones (Friese 2001; Lamont 2009). This illustrates the perfect feasibility and
pertinence of laboratory studies for IR.
What requires consideration, however, is the kind of practices that need to be
investigated if the objective is to capture not merely what scholars do that under-
scores the construction of facts and truths, but the very categories of thought that
make such knowledge possible and affect its contents, forms, and credibility.
While laboratory studies do consider the connections that extend the laboratory’s
realm of practice into its social environment, they are fundamentally interested in
science and science-relevant practices, and localization is conceived in terms that
serve that specific purpose. This focal center makes them distinctive qua praxiog-
raphies of science, which enables comparisons with other, similarly conceived com-
munities of practice (diplomats, Nongovernmental organizations workers, etc.).
My argument, then, is that against the dominant approach inspired by labora-
tory studies, the sociology of knowledge qua alternative epistemology requires an ex-
pansion toward those social practices that are not specifically scientific or aca-
demic. This follows naturally from the conception that scholarly knowledge is a
subspecies of human culture, that is also embedded in, and carried by, other
subspecies of culture, and that the social determination at work in the production
of cultural categories is best understood by examining those social structures, pro-
cesses, and practices that precede, enable, and mediate scholars’ socialization
into scholarly thought and practice proper. The first step required to advance a
praxiographic investigation of the social-determination thesis is therefore a move
from laboratory life to everyday life that, contra Berger and Luckmann ([1966]
1991), refocuses attention on scholarly knowledges.
The study of everyday life is a well-established cross-disciplinary research pro-
gram that already informs analyses of international politics and practices
(Guillaume 2011; Acuto 2014; Davies and Niemann 2017). It has, however, not
yet affected the investigation of IR itself, occupying at best an informal discursive
space in IR scholars’ private conversations and autobiographical accounts. My
purpose is not to systematize or generalize such anecdotal insights as they pertain
to IR as a profession, but rather to elevate the issue to the metaepistemological
problem concerning the mental patterns, categories, and ontologies that frame
IR knowledge itself. The next step, then, is to identify those everyday practices
that carry the mediation of the social order into collective consciousness. This
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reflects a choice of explanatory variables for the investigation of the social-
determination thesis, and the following discussion cannot be exhaustive of all var-
iables and hypotheses. It focuses specifically on how scholars’ immersion in more
or less, and differently, carpentered environments shapes their epistemic imagina-
tion and relation to the world (Seinsgebundenheit).
The notion of a carpentered world originates in anthropological and psycho-
logical research on ethno-cultural differences in human perception. Positive
empirical testing of this hypothesis suggests that people in different cultures are
differentially susceptible to such pictorial representations as geometric illusions
“because they have learned different, but always ecologically valid, visual inference
habits” (Segall et al. 1966). For a historicist, historical-materialist, functionalist,
phenomenological, or structuralist-constructivist approach, this is of significant
importance in highlighting the impact of social structures and organization on
the constitution of the categories of ordinary and scientific understanding, since
it refers to the differentiated evolution of socially transformed landscapes in more
or less urbanized, industrialized societies.
In his phenomenological-hermeneutic study of space perception, Patrick
Heelan (1983) specifically shows how such an evolution in the material culture
and artifacts of European society was a precondition for the internalization and
normalization of the Cartesian/Euclidean organization of visual space that was
central to the subsequent establishment and legitimation of the modern scientific
perspective. The carpentered environment we create in the process of social exis-
tence praxically mediates our perception of the world (our ontology) and is
hence constitutive of (the validity of) our knowledge of it (our epistemology).
Insofar as it pertains to the macro-organization of social space and the social
transformation of our ecologically mediated perception of the world, the carpen-
tered environment is especially relevant to the further exploration of theses con-
cerning variations in patterns and modes of thought along the spectral differenti-
ation of forms of social organization or modes of (re)production, and of their
respective world-forms—urban/rural, agricultural/industrial/postindustrial, sed-
entary/nomadic, etc. Studies of everyday spatial practices in the modern city, for
example, explore how its man-made spaces, structures, dimensionalities, and grids
create specific perspectives, rhythms, and modes of engagement with the world,
observable in a range of visual, discursive, and kinetic practices of everyday life
and their associated representations, texts, and technologies.
The paradigm of vision that dominates Western modern science can thus be in-
terpreted in relation to the constitution of our cognitive frames of seeing as
shaped by the spatial parameters of the modern urban landscape; the “god trick”
of ultimate vision that underscores science’s claim to objectivity (Haraway 1988) is
merely an anticipatory celebration of the fulfillment of the Icarian phantasm, now
fully experienced from the top of metropolises’ elevated megastructures (de
Certeau [1980] 1990, chap. 7), and from the flying machines that connect them
through the open, gridded skies that have replaced the metaphorical seat of the
godly perspective.
Such analyses call for systematic comparisons of how frames of seeing vary in
differently configured—that is, differently carpentered6—spaces, both urban and
rural; for example, see Bourdieu’s ethnography of the Kabyle house (Bourdieu
[1972] 2000, chap. 2). How, for example, does the urban environment—with its
Euclidean spatial organization, patterned movements along rigidified grids of
6I abstract the notion of carpentry from its wooden materiality (in terms of substance and the specific forms/
structures this substance enables) and use it as a general metaphor for the architectural configurations of our envi-
ronments (both natural and man-made). Consequently, carpentered environments encompass all worlds, not only car-
pentered worlds as defined by Segall et al. 1966. This shifts the analytical focus to how environments are differently
configured, and the effects thereof.
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linear streets, strategically positioned traffic lights, symmetrical staircases of
equally elevated steps, webs of connective metro lines, and excessively anthropic
and technical-material aesthetics—affect our frames of seeing and knowing differ-
ently than do rural environments or the (hyperbolically organized) natural ones?
How do these different ecologies and their spatial carpentries shape one’s episte-
mic imagination (i.e., the patterns, objects, and pathways of our thought-
processes)?
A comparative praxiography of knowledge produced within global IR would con-
sider how the way we existentially and praxically inhabit differently carpentered
environments along the spectrum of populated socioecological landscapes affects
our theoretical, metatheoretical, praxical, and practical engagement with our ob-
jects of study, from the international and the global to our conceptions of order,
territory, space, and borders, but also what shapes epistemic dispositions and pref-
erences for patterns and regularities, analytical or normative thinking, closed
systems, anthropocentrism, modeling, longue-dure´e perspectives, processual and
structural explanations, or a focus on agents rather than forces.
This angle creates a very different contextualization of IR knowledge than ei-
ther the geoepistemic one informed by postcolonial realities and ethno-cultural
differences between and within core and periphery scholarship, or the sociohis-
torically informed comparative genealogies of classical and contemporary dis-
courses on the world that contextualizes them in relation to the Zeitgeist, institu-
tions, and problem-constellations of their time and place. Indeed, an engagement
with, say, classical Chinese and Greek, or medieval and Enlightenment European
political thought should take into account transformations in the larger, material-
ecological structuration of consciousness and theoretical thinking that such gene-
alogies ignore or assume to be unchanging.
This approach, however, can be more systematically and comprehensively inves-
tigated if the notion of a carpentered environment is made relevant to other cate-
gories beside space (i.e., expanded to the full carpentry of everyday life). This in-
cludes the rhythms and motifs (routinized or open-ended) of private and public
time and their technologies and practices (clocks, schedules, and calendars; time-
tabling and timekeeping; and rituals of memorialization and commemoration).
As in the spatially carpentered environment, everyday practices in the temporally
carpentered environment mediate ordinary and scientific understandings of the
world, via such notions as natural recurrence and reproduction (cyclical time)
versus rational progress and technical growth (linear time) (Lefebvre [2002]
2008, 231–32), and their tempos are a defining component of our social life-
processes (Rosa 2013). They thereby also contribute to normalizing the political
order, whose authority and symbolic violence operate through the constructed
naturalness of temporal practices and representations and the hiddenness of their
life-regulating and consciousness-shaping/taming function (Bourdieu 2012).
Of the other epistemologically relevant elements that compose the carpentry of
everyday life—such as the auditory (Ihde [1976] 2007) or chromatic realms—the
way the world is populated and its various (human and nonhuman, organic and
nonorganic) populations connected is another important variable to consider.
Such a focus includes classical sociological concerns for the effects of interhuman
interaction as well as explorations of how our epistemic relation to the social and
natural order is mediated and shaped by our interaction with technology and tech-
nologies of everyday and scientific activity (Rosenberger and Verbeek 2015).
These should be utilized in pursuing explanations of the emergence, evolution,
and (de)stabilization of our ontologies as well as of our theoretical categories and
instruments, such as the gradual depersonalization of the concept of causality
that accompanied the move from animal-aided human labor to mechanized tech-
nologies of production (Childe 1949, 22) or its grounding in the exchange inter-
actions of the marketplace (Sohn-Rethel 1978, 54–56). By properly illuminating
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the social processes governing the mental processes of abstraction and ideation
wherein philosophical categories and concepts originate, this approach would
suggest very different starting points for IR scholars’ recurrent discussions of such
issues as causation, wherein epistemological differences among schools of thought
often distract from the metaepistemological consensus that unites them (e.g.,
most recently, the Journal of International Relations and Development (JIRD)
special issue on causation [Humphreys 2016]).
This line of inquiry also intersects with a core theme in the sociology of knowl-
edge, namely, the way distance and abstraction from the materiality of life insti-
tute theoretical and scholarly thinking as an alienated practice whose nature and
grounding in social life-processes are masked to one’s immediate self-
understanding. A praxiographic exploration of scholars’ immersion in environ-
ments characterized by different carpentries along a materiality-abstraction spec-
trum would help us determine how different praxical engagements with different
world-forms shape the ontological and epistemological parameters of our schol-
arly worldview.
However, only a comparison with the ontologies and epistemologies of other so-
cial groups can tell us what specifically distinguishes the skhole` from other socially
differentiated modes of engagement with, and immersion in, the world
(Seinsverbundenheit). I propose that such an inquiry into the second pathway of so-
cial determination is best pursued by approaching IR knowledge as differentiated
social labor.
Scholarly Thought as Social Labor: IR Epistemography Through a Sociology of Craft
To consider knowledge and thought as kinds of social practice is to problematize
a series of classical philosophical distinctions and dichotomies, from Aristotle’s
(2004) categories of theoria, poiesis, and praxis to Arendt’s ([1958]1998) opposition
between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa. It further entails problematizing
the second-level distinctions along which knowledge/thought and practice are
themselves subdivided on the basis of how theoretical or praxical/practical they,
their means, or their ends are (e.g., the classical-Greek division of epistemic
thought into logos, mythos, and metis, or the Arendtian division of praxis into labor,
work, and action, itself based on the distinction between animal laborans and homo
faber).
To endorse these a priori philosophical categories as a starting point for a natu-
ralist investigation of scholarly knowledge as a type of social labor is to negate the
inquiry before it has even started. But to ignore them altogether is to fail to inter-
rogate and explain their socioepistemic authority. The distinctiveness of a reflex-
ive epistemology is indeed its ability to comprehend not only the origins of its
own categories, but also what it means for theoretical thought to erase the possi-
bility of interrogating the conditions of their possibility and credibility because it
has erased the memory of its erasure of origins—for example, philosophers’ for-
gotten erasure of metis as praxical knowing in favor of logos as the only, idealist
paradigm of knowledge (Detienne and Vernant 1974) or their forgotten erasure
of artists’ praxis-based theory of art in favor of their own aesthetics as an idealist
theory of beauty (Lichtenstein 2014).
To understand, then, what distinguishes the skhole` from other modes of
engagement with the world, a working category is needed that avoids misleading
a priori distinctions and simultaneously enables us to illuminate actual differences
empirically. As distinctive from everyday practices, I turn to craft as such a cate-
gory encompassing those social practices that are constituted through the social
differentiation and specialization of human labor. Because of its etymological
root (kraft, that is, strength, power) and its genealogy spanning skill, art, and
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science, craft conveys well the nature of labor as productive (creative) and repro-
ductive and of knowledge as theoretical, praxical, and practical. This is an alterna-
tive to the French me´tier that might be even more appropriate here, since it means
profession and competence but can also refer to the artisan’s instrument, such as a
loom—the praxeological metaepistemological significance of the latter connotation
is precisely what is unfortunately lost in the translation of Bourdieu et al.’s (1968)
Le me´tier de sociologue into The Craft (not of the sociologist, but) of Sociology (1991).
Understood as socially differentiated expert practice, craft encompasses the
whole spectrum of human specialized labor and can be mobilized to empirically
explore the specificities of the skhole` as one kind among others—one that tends to
be located at the mental extreme of the mental-manual spectrum, and wherein
the “intimate connection between hand and head” (Sennett 2008, 9) appears, or
is claimed, to be dissolved to the benefit of the latter’s prominence. For the pur-
pose of a comparative sociology of IR knowledge, this spectrum should be criti-
cally interrogated by investigating the effect on epistemic representations of dif-
ferent variations of the involvement of the hand and the head (or, as discussed
earlier, of engagement with materiality and abstraction) across different crafts.
One can pursue a narrow version of such a comparative inquiry by focusing on
the craft of (IR) scholars; (IR) academics are differently located along the mental-
manual spectrum typified by the simplistic division between theoretical and exper-
imental/empirical knowledge, and one merely needs to investigate how their dif-
ferent distance from their subject-matter and their different engagement with its
concrete manifestations affect their conceptualizations, explanations, and other
representations of it. The discussion of methodologies, usually subordinated to the
discussion of epistemology, would thereby rather inform a bottom-up reconstruc-
tion of epistemological problems and standards for IR. Such an inquiry can con-
verge with the study of scholars’ everyday practices to understand how the schol-
arly habitus that sustain the skhole` are formed both before and after socialization
into science, philosophy, and academia.
It is, however, the lateral extension of the sociology of IR knowledge beyond the
skhole` that promises the most insightful comparison. Here, the point would be to
understand how variations in the involvement of the hand and the head across
different crafts and variations in the nature of laborers’ physical settings, mate-
rials, instruments, and techniques, as well as their relation to them, affect their ep-
istemic relation to their subject-matter and to the world. This first entails critically
interrogating such sociopolitically constructed categories as intellectuals and
craftsmen, which are obstacles to sociological understanding.
So-called intellectuals are not the only social laborers for whom mental labor
and theoretical knowledge are epistemically central, just as so-called craftsmen
are not the only ones for whom manual labor, praxical knowledge, and practical
knowledge are. In general terms, insofar as theoretical knowledge corresponds to
a judgment made about the meaning of some object, phenomenon, claim, or
event, every individual engages in everyday epistemic acts, and every such act is
grounded in some more or less consistent, explicit, and conscious epistemology—
a layman’s theory of knowledge/truth as it were. This epistemology is merely dif-
ferently formalized as it mainly transpires in everyday discourse, conversations,
and arguments about the world, in the various (e)valuations that underscore ev-
eryday behavior in it, and in behavior itself.
Similarly but more distinctively, every artisan and nonartisan craft, from medi-
cine to legislation and from engineering to poetry, involves a set of theoretical,
praxical, and practical knowledges whose underlying epistemology can be re-
vealed through a praxiographic investigation of their epistemic operating system
(e.g., the metis of the artisan (Schwint 2002) or her “intelligent hand” (Sennett
2008)). The artificial opposition of science and the arts has consecrated the idea
that such epistemic frameworks are substantially different from those with which
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epistemologists and philosophers of science are concerned—despite the role of
artist-engineers and craftsmen in the constitution of modern science (Zilsel 2003;
Valleriani 2010).
This is related to, and exacerbated by, the fact that epistemology is predomi-
nantly conceived and pursued as a theory of propositional knowledge (Zagzebski
1999), focused on the meaning and validity of statements about the world. Because
the epistemic corpus of the arts is “a ‘know-how’ without discourse” (de Certeau
[1980] 1990, 103) embodied in the operations and material cultures of tech-
nique, the practice-based epistemologies of artists and artisans remain invisible at
best, unless they are narrativized into existence by a trained-philosopher-turned-
craftsman (e.g., see Crawford 2009)—and in the worst case, transmuted into
theory through a scholastic hijacking by non-practitioner-philosophers. This per-
petuates the tendency to evaluate the knowledges of art from the perspective of
science. If one rather considers that homo sapiens has always necessarily been homo
faber and that art is the meeting of reason and nature (Gingras 2005) along vari-
ous epistemic and praxical pathways and through various physical configurations,
bodily deployments, techniques, instruments, and materials, then one can reverse
the prism of reference and ask (IR) scholars to interrogate the art through which
they speak of the world: What materials of the world do we craft through our labor?
Or are we artisans of representations through and through?
Such metaepistemological investigations should be complemented by a praxiog-
raphy of the transmission of IR qua craft, which would tell us more about our epi-
stemic ideologies and their consequences than the close critique of IR scholars’
ideas. Academics rely heavily, and sometimes exclusively, on the textual medium
to communicate their knowledges to others. This reflects the fact that most of
what we know academically we know because we are told by others—in the idealist
categories of foundationalist-analytical philosophy (Russell 1910–11) this “knowl-
edge by description”, as opposed to “knowledge by acquaintance”, is our predomi-
nant, language-mediated epistemology. The most striking aspect of this tendency
is that even knowledges required for empirical research are incorporated into cur-
ricula through textual media—we are told, rather than shown, how to know and
how to deploy research methods; we learn about methods instead of learning
them; we teach them to students in the classroom, not in the field of direct en-
gagement with our object-world where epistemic problems actually originate and
crystallize as problems (Bloor 1976). Our idealist practice and our metaepistemo-
logical idealism thereby recursively produce and naturalize each other.
In other social realms of epistemic activity such idealism is still marginal. In arti-
sanal crafts and in most skills of everyday life, apprenticeship and trial-and-error
are the alternative model of learning and teaching: a form of transmission that
leaves no systematic documentary trail and that needs to be observed, even experi-
enced, to be captured and understood. Neither bakers, nor carpenters learn by
consulting written texts, which doesn’t prevent them from gaining an expert theo-
retical understanding even of the underlying scientific bases of their crafts. But
philosophers’ outsider idealism has been creeping into such domains of praxis,
from the Encyclope´die’s early attempts to represent praxical knowledges to contem-
porary beliefs that we can learn any skill by reading a self-help book about it—an-
other manifestation of how ‘”our culture [has] cancerize[d] vision” (de Certeau
[1980] 1990, xlviii).
And yet actual practice confirms that there is no real epistemic substitute for
doing; this, one can easily verify by merely trying and failing, but the point is to
draw the consequences of the disjunction between an idealist understanding of
thought and practice and a praxeological one. Praxeological epistemography is
the response to the metaepistemological implications of this disjunction. Its start-
ing point is the acknowledgment that, insofar as it is intrinsically grounded in the
erasure of practice as mediator and condition of all human knowledge, idealist
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philosophical-epistemology is not merely impotent as a theory of such knowledge,
but is fundamentally itself a major obstacle to knowing.
In a recent keynote address Nicholas Onuf (forthcoming) urged us to recon-
nect with the legacy of craft that IR “traded in . . . for the cult of theory subject to
the methods of science” and to seriously reflect on how the divorce of the two cul-
tures has affected our understanding and practice of our vocation as well as our
ability to serve the common good. Approaching IR through a sociology of craft
would first allow us to understand how different configurations of social labor—
the most structured and structuring medium of our existential boundedness—af-
fect epistemic standpoints and hence understand the specificity of our own. But
insofar as we inhabit a common world upon whose objects IR scholars have no
monopoly, a comparison of how our own subject-matter is perceived and lived by
those whose labor is differently engaged in/with the world can also further illumi-
nate the sociohistorically and praxically situated grounding of our scholarly world-
view, as well as its distinctive social value and worth.
IR is now interested in how the international, security, borders, etc. are under-
stood by ordinary people that inhabit the world differently—diplomats, refugees,
or border security agents. This is an important investigation that should be pur-
sued more systematically (i.e., explicitly and confidently advanced, against the
snobbery of metatheorists, as an inquiry into everyday epistemology). But, it needs
to specifically focus on differentiated social labor. Without this, we cannot ground
our own vocational epistemology in a properly reflexive understanding of the so-
cial determinants of our philosophy and science. And without that, we cannot
fully enact our social role as a legitimate and responsible competitor in the social
struggles for meaning, truth, and action.
Indeed, an idealized (e.g., Weberian) understanding of our vocation based on
analytical demarcations cannot illuminate (to us and others) the social history and
hence the nature of the place from which we speak to the world about the world. And
unless we ourselves understand what objectively creates our scholarly standpoint as
a distinctive one (regardless of whether it is or not superior), we cannot successfully
address the social reactions this standpoint provokes (such as recurrent attacks on
our expertise) or navigate the social dilemmas and conflicts in which it engages us.
It is in this sense that the pursuit of a better theory of (our) knowledge—a better
epistemology—is paradoxically the shortest and most efficient way of addressing
IR’s perennial questions about what we are practically for (Brown 2016).
Conclusion
The first purpose of this article was to draw attention to, and diagnose, the failure
of IR’s sociological turn to extend the reach of sociological reason into the philo-
sophical turf of epistemology. Its second purpose was to revive and deploy, in con-
ceptually and empirically meaningful terms, the radical version of the sociology of
knowledge that can achieve an autonomous reconstruction of epistemology suited
to a post-Kantian consciousness. I hope to have adequately and coherently
mapped the terrain from which such a reconstruction can be successfully pur-
sued, thereby laying a solid basis for a future discussion of the actual methodolo-
gies and methods that serve such a project, as well as its preliminary results. In
the meantime, some concluding remarks on its critical and reconstructive objec-
tives might help further highlight its significance in the current global socio-
intellectual context.
The sociology of knowledge was born in and of socio-intellectual transforma-
tions and crises similar to the globalized one(s) we are witnessing today—the rise,
coexistence, and violent competition of profoundly contradictory worldviews; the
erosion of epistemic and sociomoral consensus; the destabilization of socioepiste-
mic authorities and the socionormative orders they sustain. Its distinctive gaze,
INANNA HAMATI-ATAYA 25
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isr/article-abstract/20/1/3/4086540
by University of Cambridge user
on 07 March 2018
purpose, and instruments were forged in, and in response to, such critical trans-
formations, with a belief that reflexivity enabled a lucid critique of contemporane-
ous paradigms of truth without giving up on the possibility of an epistemically
meaningful future.
The sociology of knowledge, then, was the first critical engagement with the
‘politics of truth’ that triggered the postpositivist turn, and its proper revival can
help us today face the ‘politics of untruth or post-truth’ that now place postposi-
tivists in an uncomfortable socio-intellectual position. One should acknowledge
the current malaise without necessarily endorsing the accusation that postfounda-
tionalism’s critique of truth, facts, objectivity, and science is single-handedly re-
sponsible for the erosion of their social value. If we take seriously the notion that
ideas matter in the social constitution of the social world, then we do have to hon-
estly consider the actual socioacademic impact of this critique, but also ask
whether we have adequately equipped ourselves (and others) to face the full con-
sequences of the loss of epistemic foundations—especially our seeming inability
to sustain a coherent social discourse on the validity of (social-)science’s own
truths when it finds itself under attack in the sociopolitical arena.
For those who, two decades ago, entirely dismissed Alan Sokal’s warning about
epistemic relativism and deconstruction (Sokal and Bricmont 1998), Sokal’s re-
venge might bear only poisonous fruit—a reactionary return to an extreme posi-
tivism/scientism desperately brandished against the new dogmas of the age, a
stubborn retreat into increasingly idealized postures of critique, or a frantic flight
back into the pragmatics of political struggle. Neither of these positions—includ-
ing Sokal’s—can coherently reconcile the social defense of truth with a critical un-
derstanding of its social nature and its social conditions of possibility. Nor are all
postpositivisms capable of carrying such an important and urgent project—Which
theoretical positions on truth and science confidently and critically expressed on
the pages of IR journals are honestly compatible, and which are embarrassingly at
odds, with the actual trust their authors place in the knowledges of the physicians,
aeronautic engineers, and pharmacists that sustain their daily lives?
If freed of its self-imposed limitations, a social constructionism informed by a
revolutionary sociology of knowledge can deliver a coherent, empowering, and
morally responsible position on knowledge, truth, and science. This requires a
more sophisticated and comprehensive formulation of the nature and processes
of social constitution, but also a consideration of the proper nature and role of
human agency in such processes. Social-determination theorists remind us that
while the world we engage is indeed one of our own making, it makes us back—
and thereby constrains us—as well as the categories through which we perceive,
value, and enact it. The sociology of knowledge is therefore also an invitation to
acknowledge again, and reinstitute without inhibition, the specific criticality of
the structuralist perspective, so that we might properly “locate [our] responsibili-
ties where [our] freedoms really are” (Bourdieu 1990b, 15).
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